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In his article, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, Professor
Nance has certainly made a valuable contribution to the literature by
cautioning us against using the term “reliability” in an imprecise
1
manner suggesting that reliability is a binary, dichotomous concept.
In the haste to make a point about another aspect of Daubert v. Merrell
2
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its progeny, we can succumb to the
temptation to oversimplify the treatment of reliability and
3
4
inadvertently imply that the reliability is a categorical, all-or-nothing
proposition. I would be the first to admit that I have sometimes
written sentences carrying that implication.
Professor Nance,
however, constructs a persuasive case that there is no invariant
5
6
reliability threshold or uniform, minimum reliability level that
proffered expert testimony must satisfy in order to be admissible.
The question is not whether the concept of reliability is a relative
one. Rather, the issue is in which respects the concept is relative.
There are at least three respects in which the concept is certainly
relative: (1) the specificity of the theory or technique the expert
asserts; (2) the use to which the expert’s proponent wants to put the
claim; and (3) the definiteness with which the expert proposes
couching his or her ultimate opinion. Part I of this Article discusses
the first respect. Essentially concurring with Professor Risinger’s
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recent article, Part I contends that the foundational showing of
reliability should vary with the precise theory or technique the expert
invokes. The focus should be a narrow one, squarely on that theory
or technique. Part II turns to the second respect, the use to which
the expert’s proponent wants to put the theory or technique. This
Part asks whether the proponent is content to prove simply that the
theory exists and is current in the expert’s field, or whether the
proponent wants to draw a further inference from the application of
the theory. The reliability foundations for these two uses of the
8
theory differ fundamentally. Part III addresses the third respect,
adding that the reliability concept is also variable in regard to the
definiteness of the expert’s proposed opinion. The more definite the
opinion the expert offers, the more extensive the reliability
foundation must be. In each of these respects, I agree with Professor
Nance’s thesis that reliability should be conceived in relative terms.
Indeed, as this Article concludes, the identification of those respects
may help courts develop a workable approach to determining
whether proffered expert testimony possesses the requisite degree of
reliability.
Near the end of his article, however, Professor Nance urges that
reliability be treated as relative in still another respect: in comparison
9
to other expert testimony available to the expert’s proponent. In an
earlier exchange with Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and Sanders, I
voiced my opposition to incorporating a better or best evidence
10
principle into the analysis of foundations for Rule 702 opinions.
During that exchange, I took the position that it would be unsound
to adopt such a principle either as a matter of statutory construction
or as one of evidentiary policy. I still adhere to that position.
However, while Professor Faigman and his co-authors appeared to
favor a rather general better evidence principle, Professor Nance’s
proposal is much more complex. His proposal turns on such
considerations as whether the proponent of the evidence is a repeat
11
player in the litigation system and whether better evidence is
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reasonably available to the opponent who objects to the admission of
12
the proponent’s expert testimony. The proposal is provocative. Yet,
it suffers from a significant ambiguity and raises additional, practical
difficulties that render the proposal undesirable. Part IV of this
Article will identify that ambiguity and outline those difficulties.
I. RELATIVITY IN REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC THEORY OR
TECHNIQUE ON WHICH THE PROPONENT’S EXPERT
PROPOSES TO RELY—WHAT MUST BE VALIDATED
In authentication law, to evaluate the sufficiency of a
foundation, the judge must initially determine what the proponent’s
13
witness claims the item of evidence to be. One foundation would
suffice if the witness asserted that she had received a letter
purportedly signed by Dale Nance, while an entirely different
foundation would be necessary if the witness asserted that Dale Nance
in fact signed the letter. Likewise, in order to intelligently assess the
adequacy of the proponent’s validation foundation for an expert
opinion, the first question to be asked is what must be validated.
14
In his recent article, Professor Risinger argued that it is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the proponent to establish the global
validity of the expert’s discipline. The focus is narrower; it ought to
be on the specific theory or technique on which the expert expects to
rely. Thus, suppose that the expert identifies himself or herself as a
questioned document examiner. Questioned document examination
is a huge field, and its practitioners opine about a myriad of
determinations such as the identification of paper and ink, the age of
documents, the sequence of marks, and comparisons of handwriting
15
style.
Assume, though, that in a particular case the examiner
proposes to testify that certain printing was forged. To lay the
foundation for that testimony, it would be neither necessary nor
sufficient for the expert’s proponent to demonstrate the general
validity of questioned document examination.
Rather, the
proponent must establish that qualified questioned document
examiners can reliably determine whether printing—as opposed to
16
cursive writing—has been forged.
12
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It is true that at one point in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
Justice Breyer utilized language suggesting that the proponent must
demonstrate the global validity of the expert’s discipline. In that
passage, using the examples of astrology and necromancy, he asserted
18
that sometimes “the discipline itself lacks reliability.” However, the
19
trilogy of Daubert, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and Kumho contains
much more language pointing to the sensible conclusion that the
expert’s precise theory or technique is what must be validated. For
example, as Professor Risinger has emphasized, in Daubert, the
Supreme Court inquired whether the expert’s theory or technique is
20
sufficiently reliable to perform “the task at hand.” The narrow focus
is even more explicit in Kumho. Justice Breyer noted that the
question was not the general reliability of “a tire expert’s use of a
visual and tactile inspection to determine whether overdeflection had
21
caused [a] tire’s tread to separate from its steel-belted carcass.” The
Justice stressed, rather, that the plaintiffs’ expert had invoked a more
“particular” method, a theory that there are four characteristic signs
of tire abuse and that the absence of at least two of the signs indicates
22
that the accident was caused by a manufacturing defect in the tire.
In a separate passage, Justice Breyer pointed out that the expert
“employed a more specific theory to establish the existence (or
23
absence) of such abuse.”
24
In their article, Professors Gross and Mnookin propose a
distinction between instruction and assessment. They give an
example drawn from the domain of psychological testimony. In their
terminology, it is an instruction for an expert psychologist to tell a
jury that, as a general proposition, cross-racial identifications are less
reliable than same-race identifications. In contrast, the expert would
be testifying to an assessment if she were to tell the jury that in her
opinion, the cross-racial identification by the complainant in the
instant case is likely to be unreliable. Professors Gross and Mnookin
suggest that a specific assessment requires a different, more extensive
foundation than a general instruction. That suggestion is sound, and
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the courts have recognized this distinction. The distinction can be
restated in terms of the specific theory the witness asserts. For
example, in instruction cases, the witness asserts the generalized
proposition that cross-racial identifications are less trustworthy than
same-race identifications. In assessment cases, however, the expert
makes a quite different assertion: that she knows of criteria or
guidelines that enable her to determine whether a particular crossracial identification is likely to be untrustworthy. Different expert
assertions necessitate different reliability foundations.
Simply stated, the only sensible approach is to focus on the
expert’s specific assertion rather than the global validity of the
expert’s discipline. At any given time, the discourse in a field of
26
expertise ordinarily includes a wide spectrum of propositions. Some
propositions are speculations that will later be disproven. Other
propositions are conjectures that will subsequently be validated. Still
other propositions are assertions that have already been
substantiated. Given the state of knowledge in most expert fields, it
would be silly to consider only the reliability of the broad field.
There are, however, a few caveats. At some point in the analysis,
as Professor Allen observes in his contribution to this Symposium, a
27
broader, more global focus is necessary. To assess the foundation
for the specific theory or technique, the judge must inquire into the
soundness of the methodology the expert used to validate the theory
or technique. The analysis of that methodology will require the
judge to range beyond the precise theory or technique invoked in the
instant case. Furthermore, as Professor Nance warns, if Professor
Risinger’s approach is “pressed to its logical conclusion, this would
make determinations of reliability all but impossible, for the
28
particular task at hand in a lawsuit is never replicated in research.”
Although I do not presume to speak for Professor Risinger, it
would appear that his approach could be refined to meet these
objections. On the one hand, the validation foundation must target a
proposition more general than the validity of the conclusion in the
instant case. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that “[t]he focus . . .
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
29
conclusions that they generate.” That statement is true both in the
25
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sense that the novelty of the conclusion is no longer a bar to
admissibility and in the sense that, in evaluating the foundation, the
judge must consider the broader principles and methods employed
to establish the conclusion.
On the other hand, an adequate foundation will not target
propositions broader than the theory or technique the expert invokes
to justify the conclusion. In Kumho, the expert was not content to
premise his opinion on the general trustworthiness of visual and
tactile inspection of the tire. Instead, he attempted to make the
opinion appear more authoritative and exacting by relying on a more
specific theory. The expert’s proponent, therefore, was obliged to lay
a reliability foundation for that more specific theory. That theory in
effect served as the major premise for the expert’s reasoning
30
process, and, consequently, that theory had to be shown to be
reliable. The reliability foundation must be judged relative to that
particular theory.
II. RELATIVITY IN REGARD TO THE USE TO WHICH THE
PROPONENT INTENDS TO PUT THE EXPERT’S THEORY OR
TECHNIQUE—WHY THE PROPONENT IS PROFFERING
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE THEORY OR TECHNIQUE
31

32

In character and hearsay doctrine, the proposed use of the
testimony often determines the extent and type of foundation that
the proponent must lay. When the proffered evidence is logically
33
34
relevant on a noncharacter or nonhearsay theory, the foundation
will be much more minimal than if the proponent attempted to
introduce the item for a substantive character or hearsay purpose.
Analogously, in gauging the proponent’s foundation for an expert
opinion, the judge must not only identify which theory or technique
the expert is relying on; the judge must also force the proponent to
specify why the proponent is offering the testimony about the theory
or technique. This may be what Professor Nance means when he
writes that the degree of required reliability depends in part on the
35
litigation context. To what use is the proponent putting the theory
or technique?
30
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There are numerous potential uses to which the proponent
36
could put the testimony. Two uses, however, are the most common.
37
38
The first is a descriptive or summarizational use. Suppose, for
instance, that the question is the meaning of the term “chicken” in a
39
sales contract. The plaintiff calls an experienced member of the
poultry industry to give expert testimony about the meaning of the
term within the trade. The only issue is the existence of the linguistic
convention or usage. If the witness testifies that she has been
involved in a significant number of similar sales transactions involving
the same term, that experience is an adequate foundation. Or
assume that in a criminal case, the prosecution calls an experienced
undercover narcotics officer to give expert testimony that “lid” has a
40
certain meaning in drug argot. The only issue is the existence of
the convention within the illegal drug trade. When the proponent’s
limited purpose in introducing expert testimony is to establish the
existence of a usage, convention, or practice, a showing that the
witness has had a large number of similar experiences ought to
suffice as an adequate foundation.
41
42
The second type of use—inferential or translational —is
fundamentally different. In this setting, the proponent wants to do
more than prove the existence of the convention or practice. The
proponent is not merely trying to establish that theory or convention
A exists; rather, the proponent wants the expert to employ theory A
as a basis for drawing a further inference, B. A foundation showing
only the existence of theory A falls short of validating this proposed
use of the expert testimony.
36
A third potential use is a normative usage. A proponent might offer a
bioethicist’s testimony for such a purpose. See D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary
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By way of example, suppose that the proponent wants an expert
to testify about rape trauma syndrome to support an inference that a
woman showing symptoms of the syndrome was indeed raped. Here,
the issue is not simply whether the theory of rape trauma syndrome is
current in counseling circles. The issue is whether the theory can be
43
used as “a fact-finding tool.” Does the woman’s satisfaction of the
profile support inference B, that she previously suffered a certain
type of traumatic event, namely, a rape? This contemplated use of
the expert testimony necessitates a very different sort of reliability
foundation.
Given the contemplated use, the proponent should ordinarily be
44
required to show the results of the use of the theory. Have there
been attempts to employ the theory as a fact-finding tool? If so, do
the results of those attempts indicate that the theory enables the
expert to accurately determine whether the alleged victim has indeed
been raped? For instance, was the profile derived from a database
constructed by researchers who independently corroborated the rape
45
allegations of the women who were included in the database? When
the expertise in question is non-scientific in character, the expert may
not be able to resort to the classic methodology of controlled
46
experimentation and induction.
Nevertheless, logic dictates that
there be some showing that the use of the theory or technique
enables the expert to accurately make the determination the
proponent offers the opinion to establish. The showing could be
formal in character, including proficiency studies or prospective or
retrospective research. Or the showing could be informal. Suppose
that a dog handler claims that by observing his dog’s behavior, he can
determine whether the dog is alerted to the presence of drugs or
explosives. At the very least, the judge should demand a showing of
the track record of the dog working with the handler.
The general necessity for a foundational showing of results to
validate an inferential claim reflects the reasons why our society,
including its legal system, relies so heavily on expert information. It
would be foolish to contend that we are so reliant on expert data
because the average citizen has consciously adopted any particular
43
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45
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philosophy of science. The average person has given little, if any,
thought to that issue. Rather, we place faith in science because there
47
is an “immense body of results” proving “its worth in the realm of
48
Those concrete results—science’s many
material technique.”
49
50
practical,
successful
applications
and
technological
51
52
achievements —are the pragmatic basis for the societal belief in the
validity of systematic experimental testing and induction. Just as
those results are the primary explanation for our faith in general
scientific methodology, a showing of results will usually be the key to
validating specific inferential claims.
III. RELIABILITY IN REGARD TO THE DEGREE OF CERTITUDE
OF THE EXPERT’S ULTIMATE OPINION—HOW DEFINITELY
DOES THE EXPERT PROPOSE TO PHRASE HIS OR HER
ULTIMATE OPINION
It is hornbook law, codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
that a lay witness must possess firsthand or personal knowledge to be
53
qualified to testify about a fact or event. However, even when a lay
witness has some personal knowledge, the permissible definiteness of
his or her testimony depends on the extent of the foundation. If a
lay witness has a momentary, fleeting view of a person, the witness
might be permitted to testify only that the person appeared to be a
tall man. But if the witness had a longer, better opportunity to
observe the person, the witness may be allowed to go farther and
54
testify that the person was the defendant.
There is a parallel in expert testimony law. The degree of
allowable definiteness of the expert’s final opinion should vary with
the reliability foundation laid by the expert’s proponent. Assume, for
example, that an epidemiologist is prepared to testify only that a
person’s exposure to a certain pesticide increases or enhances the
person’s risk of contracting a particular illness. Some courts would
allow the epidemiologist to testify to that opinion so long as the
supporting epidemiological study found a relative risk (“RR”)

47
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49
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50
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51
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53
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55

exceeding 1.0.
Alternatively, suppose that the expert wanted to
express the more definite opinion that it is probable that exposure to
the pesticide can cause the illness. In that event, many courts would
rule the same foundation inadequate; they reason that only a study
finding an RR greater than 2.0 justifies an opinion couched as a
56
probability.
The Court’s analysis in Joiner is illustrative. There, the plaintiffs’
experts opined that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs at work was “likely
57
responsible for” his cancer. In the lead opinion, the Chief Justice
carefully scrutinized the animal studies cited by the plaintiffs’ experts.
He stressed that the case did not pose the broad, abstract question
“‘whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an
58
expert’s opinion.’” Rather, the question presented was “whether
these experts’ opinions were sufficiently supported by the animal
59
studies on which they purported to rely.” The Chief Justice found
60
so many dissimilarities between the facts of the Joiner case and the
parameters in the studies that the trial judge had not abused his
61
discretion in rejecting the opinion. Hence, like the specific theory
the expert invokes and the use to which the expert’s proponent wants
to put the theory, the definiteness of the expert’s opinion helps
determine the degree of reliability that the proponent must establish.
IV. RELIABILITY IN REGARD TO THE OTHER EXPERT
EVIDENCE REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO THE PROPONENT
AND OPPONENT
If Professor Nance had said only that the reliability concept is
relative in the three regards discussed above, I would be in complete
agreement with him. He identifies a fourth respect, however, in
which he contends the courts should treat reliability as a gradational
or relative concept. He argues that the judge ought to evaluate the
reliability of the proffered expert evidence in relation and
62
comparison to alternative, available expert testimony. According to
55

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 15-5(D).
Id.
57
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140.
58
Id. at 144 (citation omitted).
59
Id. (emphasis in original).
60
Id. Although Joiner was an adult, the studies involved infant mice. Relative to
size, Joiner’s exposure was much less than that in the studies. In the studies, PCB’s
were injected directly, while Joiner’s exposure was dermal. Finally, Joiner developed
small-cell carcinomas, while the mice developed alveologenic adenomas.
61
Id. at 146-47.
62
Nance, supra note 1, at Part II.
56
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Professor Nance, “exclusion is appropriate on this theory only when
more reliable expertise is (a) reasonably available to the proponent,
63
and (b) not reasonably available to the opponent.” “[W]hen . . .
more reliable expertise is reasonably available to the opponent to
64
present . . ., then no exclusion of evidence is warranted . . . .” In
Professor Nance’s view, his proposed approach “will place greater
demands on powerful civil defendants than on impecunious civil
65
plaintiffs.”
Professor Nance then expands on his definition of
reasonable availability. He states that
greater reliability might be unavailable to a party within the
context of a particular case . . ., yet reasonably available to that
party within the context of repeated litigation of the same or
similar issue. At the outer reaches of the better evidence idea,
repeat players, such as the state in regard to forensic science
techniques, may plausibly be considered in regard to the long run
of cases, rather than based on what is reasonably available in the
66
short enough run to address a particular case.

As Parts I through III explain, I agree with Professor Nance that
the concept of reliability under Federal Rule 702 should be treated as
relative in several respects. In this fourth respect, however, I part
company with Professor Nance. Although a best evidence rule or
principle can operate legitimately at trial in several respects, it should
not be incorporated into the judge’s evaluation of a reliability
foundation under Rule 702. Subpart 1 discusses the legitimate scope
of the operation of a best evidence principle at trial while Subpart 2
critiques Professor Nance’s proposal.
A. The Legitimate Operation of a Best Evidence Rule or Principle at
Trial.
A true best evidence rule, of course, operates under Article X of
67
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In several respects, the drafters
relaxed the common-law best evidence rule. For example, they
68
broadened the definition of “duplicate” and made duplicates
69
The drafters, however,
presumptively as admissible as originals.
decided to retain a liberalized version of the rule rather than
altogether abolishing the rule.
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 237.
Id. at 231 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 237.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. Art. X.
Id. 1001(4).
Id. 1003.
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There are other ways a best evidence principle may legitimately
come into play during trial. It is certainly permissible for an
opponent to attack the weight of the proponent’s expert testimony by
pointing out that the expert neglected to use a superior analytic
70
technique. Suppose, for instance, that a prosecution trace evidence
expert utilized a conventional optical microscope to analyze
associative physical evidence. The usual working magnification of an
optical microscope is 1,000 times. To attack the weight of the
expert’s testimony, the defense counsel could force the expert to
concede that she did not use a scanning electron microscope
(“SEM”) to visualize the evidence.
An SEM can produce
magnifications exceeding 200,000 times.
Similarly, in a drug case defended by Mr. Shellow, if the
prosecution were foolish enough to be content to rely on an addict’s
visual identification of the alleged drug, Mr. Shellow would be
certain to make the prosecution pay for that foolishness. There are,
to be sure, limits to the efficacy of cross-examination. A skillful
opponent, however, can nonetheless mount an effective weight attack
by underscoring that the proponent’s expert employed an inferior
71
analytic technique.
The prospect of such an attack gives the
proponent a natural incentive to proffer the best evidence available.
That potentially potent incentive is already built into the adversary
system.
Just as an expert’s failure to use a superior technique can be the
basis for an attack on the weight of the expert’s testimony, the failure
occasionally can render the case of the expert’s proponent
vulnerable to a legal sufficiency attack. The case law on the
identification of contraband drugs furnishes an example. By the
majority view, a visual identification by an experienced drug user or
narcotics officer constitutes admissible non-scientific, expert
72
testimony.
Some of the same courts admitting such testimony,
however, caution that “[w]e suspect that it would be a rare case in
which a witness’s statement that a particular substance looked like a
controlled substance would alone be sufficient to support a
73
conviction.” In a number of additional cases, courts have held that
70
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §
10-8 (3d ed. 1997).
71
Id.
72
Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel J. Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the War on
Drugs: A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript White
Powder in Narcotics Prosecutions, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 562-65 (1998).
73
Id. at 562 (citing Commonwealth v. Dawson, 504 N.E.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Mass.
1987)).
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although admissible, testimony about non-specific drug identification
tests, such as field color change tests, is legally insufficient to establish
74
the identity of a substance. These courts insist on confirmation of
the substance’s identity by a superior, more specific analytic
methodology such as gas chromatography/mass spectrometry
(“GC/MS”).
Finally, a best evidence principle may operate under the aegis of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 authorizes the judge to
exclude relevant evidence in her discretion when the probative value
of the evidence “is substantially outweighed by” countervailing
probative dangers such as “needless presentation of cumulative
75
evidence” and “unfair prejudice.”
The accompanying Advisory
Committee Note states that “[t]he availability of other means of proof
76
may . . . be an appropriate factor” for the judge to consider. For
example, assume that in a drug prosecution, the government has two
available laboratory analysts who have confirmed the substance’s
identity as cocaine by gas chromatography (“GC”) as well as GC/MS.
In order to “overkill,” the government also plans to call the
defendant’s parole officer, a former narcotics officer. The officer is
prepared to testify that he saw the substance in the defendant’s
possession at the time of arrest and that, in his opinion, the substance
was cocaine. Calling the parole officer as a witness creates the risk of
prejudice to the defendant, since it may “slip out” that the witness is
the defendant’s parole officer, implying that the defendant has a
77
prior criminal record.
Further, the presentation of the officer’s
testimony would arguably amount to the “needless presentation of
cumulative evidence,” because common sense suggests that the jury
would attach much more weight to the scientific analyses. The
combination of probative dangers would certainly warrant the judge’s
exclusion of the officer’s testimony. For that matter, the obviously
cumulative character of the evidence might in itself prompt the judge
to exclude it. The introduction of the officer’s testimony is likely to
have little or no effect on the jury’s decision as to whether there is
adequate evidence that the drug found in the defendant’s possession
74
People v. Hagberg, 703 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998), appeal granted, 712
N.E.2d 820 (Ill. 1999); 2 SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 15, § 23-5 (collecting cases).
75
FED. R. EVID. 403.
76
See id. 403 advisory committee’s note; see also Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172 (1997).
77
FED. R. EVID. 404-05, 609. If the defendant elected not to testify, the
prosecution could not introduce testimony about the defendant’s record under Rule
609. Further, the defendant’s prior criminal acts might not be logically relevant on
any noncharacter theory of admissibility.
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is cocaine.
B. The Problematic Nature of the Proposed Best Evidence Principle
Operating as a Component of the Reliability Analysis Under Rule
702.
Professor Nance acknowledges that best evidence reasoning can
78
come into play under Rule 403. However, he favors giving the best
evidence principle wider play. He argues that the judicial system
should “want a . . . set of standards” under Rule 702 that is “not
79
simply redundant of Rule 403.” Professor Nance expressly states
that Rule 702 should be construed as incorporating a best evidence
80
principle imposing “stricter demands” than Rule 403.
As previously stated, in an earlier exchange with Professor
Faigman and his coauthors, I expressed my opposition to the
81
formulation of a best evidence principle in Rule 702 analysis. My
opposition rests on both statutory construction and policy reasons.
The drafters evidently did not contemplate any best evidence
principle under Article VII. Having relaxed the best evidence rule
proper under Article X, it would have been at least anomalous for
them to have decided to extend the reach of the common-law
principle to a new area, namely, expert testimony law. Any such
extension would be at odds with the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 702. That note not only indicates that a witness need not be a
specialist to qualify as an expert; the note also sanctions the
admission of a landowner’s opinion of the value of his or her
82
property, a markedly inferior type of opinion testimony.
Quite apart from the interpretive difficulty of justifying reading a
best evidence principle into Rule 702, Professor Nance’s proposal for
the creation of such a principle under Rule 702 is problematic. The
initial problem is that Professor Nance never provides a substantive
definition of “reliability.” He negatively rejects several alternative
83
“blind alleys,” but he does not venture affirmative guidance for
defining the term. At one point, he states that the judge should
“plac[e] herself in the position of the jury” and ask “whether the
challenged expertise is so unreliable, in comparison to other
78
79
80
81

Nance, supra note 1, at 202.
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Id. at 228.
A Final Comment, supra note 10, at 669. See generally Enough is Enough, supra note
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expertise offered by the same party, that the judge would ignore the
84
challenged proffer if she were the trier of fact.” That statement
hardly functions as a working definition of “reliability.” Rather than
telling the judge what algorithm to use or which factors to consider,
this proposal seemingly requires the judge to intuit or speculate as to
the reliability standards the jurors would employ. The proposal gives
the judge detailed directions as to how to rule once the judge decides
whether more “reliable” evidence is reasonably available. But those
directions are of little help to the judge without a substantive
definition of reliability. That definition has to be one of the starting
points of the judge’s analysis, and the proposal is conspicuously
lacking a definition.
The lack of a definition of reliability is a major flaw in the
proposal. A wide variety of expert techniques could address the issue
to which the proffered evidence relates. As Professor Nance notes,
“When a matter is thought by counsel to be amenable to expert
assistance, there are often numerous specializations and hundreds or
85
thousands of practitioners thereof who might be called to testify.”
Suppose, for example, that one available technique has been
86
subjected to more rigorous peer review, but another has a smaller
87
rate of error, and still a third enjoys more widespread support in the
88
Under the proposal, how does the judge
specialty community.
decide which technique is the better or best one? Professor Nance’s
proposal requires the judge to make that decision, but the proposal
does not furnish the judge with guidance as to how to make the
decision.
Moreover, the adoption of the proposal will have untoward
policy consequences. The most immediate consequence would be to
render Rule 702 unworkable as a rule of trial evidence for jury trials.
The proposal multiplies the number of foundational issues that the
judge must resolve before making a final ruling on the objection to
the proponent’s evidence. The judge must decide: (1) whether the
proponent’s evidence is “reliable”; (2) whether other expert
techniques address the same question; (3) whether those techniques
are better than the technique utilized by the proponent’s expert; (4)
whether a better technique is reasonably available to the proponent;
(5) whether the better technique is reasonably available to the
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 227-28.
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Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
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opponent; and (6) whether the proponent is a repeat player. The
administration of this rule during a jury trial will necessitate either
horrendously long sidebar conferences or prolonged recesses.
It is not just that the proposal will lengthen the amount of time
devoted to the litigation of Rule 702 objections. In addition, the
proposal will permit, and in some cases require, the judge to consider
information to which the jury should not be exposed. All of these
preliminary questions will fall under Rule 104(a) rather than Rule
90
104(b). The final sentence of Rule 104(a) reads, “In making its
determination [under Rule 104(a), the judge] is not bound by the
91
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.”
Suppose, for example, that the defense contends that the
plaintiff is a repeat player. In support of that contention, the defense
might proffer foundational testimony about the plaintiff’s frequent
involvement in prior, similar suits. In effect, that testimony would be
evidence of the plaintiff’s litigiousness—a type of evidence that the
92
jury is ordinarily precluded from hearing. Assume alternatively that
the plaintiff contends that although a better type of expertise exists, it
is reasonably available to the defendant because only the defendant
can afford that type of expert.
By distinguishing between
“impecunious civil plaintiffs” and “powerful civil defendants,”
Professor Nance strongly implies that the litigant’s financial ability is
a relevant, if not dispositive, consideration on the question of
93
reasonable availability. The jury, however, is usually shielded from
evidence of a defendant’s wealth unless punitive damages are at
94
issue. Given the volume and type of information relevant to the
preliminary facts implicated by Professor Nance’s proposal, in many
cases the issues would have to be aired at a pretrial hearing rather
than at trial. Daubert and its progeny have already triggered a trend
95
toward pretrial resolution of the admissibility of expert testimony.
The adoption of Professor Nance’s proposal would accelerate that
trend. The net result of the adoption of the proposal would be more
and longer pretrial hearings challenging the admissibility of expert
89
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testimony.
The acceleration of that trend might disadvantage the very
classes of litigants whom Professor Nance hopes to benefit. Again, he
argues that his proposal would not only benefit the judicial system
96
but also “impecunious civil plaintiffs.” Quite the opposite could
come to pass. No matter how the burden of persuasion is allocated
97
on these new preliminary facts, the proposal allows wealthy
corporations to litigate additional issues before trial as a condition to
the plaintiff’s right to introduce expert testimony. By doing so, the
proposal will enhance the defense’s ability to raise the cost of pretrial
98
proceedings to such dizzying heights that even a plaintiff with a
meritorious claim will be bludgeoned into an unfavorable
99
settlement. In the aftermath of Daubert, civil defendants appear to
be gaining pretrial summary judgment in a higher percentage of
100
cases. The adoption of Professor Nance’s proposal might intensify
101
that trend. Thus, to use Professor Sanders’s expression, the
proposal raises profound procedural justice concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
While in the final analysis Professor Nance’s best evidence
proposal is flawed, he has performed an important service by
focusing attention on the respects in which the reliability standard
under Rule 702 should be considered relative. Indeed, a synthesis of
those respects has the promise to furnish a working approach to the
problem of deciding whether a proponent’s reliability foundation
suffices under Rule 702. It is submitted that the judge should initiate
his or her analysis by identifying the precise theory or technique on
which the expert contemplates relying. If the expert refuses to
articulate a general theory or technique, the expert gives the judge
no choice; the judge must conclude that the expert’s opinion rests
only on ipse dixit. The Supreme Court has twice made it quite clear
that, as a matter of law, this is an inadequate basis for an expert
96
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opinion. Once the expert identifies his or her major premise, the
judge will know what must be validated.
At the next step, the judge should press the expert’s proponent
to specify why the proponent wants to introduce the testimony about
the theory or technique. Is the proponent introducing the testimony
for purely descriptive or summarizational purposes? If so, the
proponent’s reliability foundation must demonstrate that the expert
has had a large number of similar experiences. In contrast, if the
proponent wants to proffer the testimony for inferential or
translational purposes, the reliability foundation must be more
extensive. Ideally, the proponent can marshal testimony about
controlled experimentation and induction validating the inference.
Even in the case of non-scientific expertise, however, the proponent
should usually be obliged to lay a foundation establishing the results
of the use of the theory or technique and demonstrating that those
results show that the theory or technique enables the expert to
accurately draw the inference in question.
Finally, particularly in the case of inferential or translational
claims, the judge ought to insist that the expert specify the degree of
certitude of his or her final opinion. The degree of allowable
certitude depends in large part on the state of the research data cited
as validation for the theory or technique. In some cases, the state of
those data will not support anything beyond a conclusion that there is
a possible nexus between A and B.
The answers to these three questions specify the proponent’s
“claim” about the proffered expert evidence. For example, after
analyzing the questions, the judge might conclude that the
proponent is essentially claiming that by invoking the rape trauma
syndrome theory (step #1), the proponent’s expert can accurately
determine whether there is a probability (step #3) that the
complainant was in fact (step #2) raped. To make the required
“reliability” determination, the judge would inquire whether, as a
matter of logic, the proponent’s foundation is adequate to support
that precise claim. At each step in the analysis, the judge would be
making a familiar inquiry. The first step is similar to the starting
point in authentication analysis, the next step is analogous to a
common stage in character and hearsay analysis, and the final step is
parallel to a frequent inquiry in applying the personal knowledge
doctrine.
Admittedly, this approach does not constitute a mathematical
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algorithm, and it will not mechanically yield judicial rulings. To an
important degree, this approach requires the trial judge to exercise
prudential judgment in making such determinations as whether
there are enough prior experiences and whether they are similar
enough to the facts in the instant litigation. Ultimately, no matter
what verbal formula we add as gloss to Rule 702, there may be no
escape from reliance on the trial judiciary’s judgment and common
sense. In the final analysis, however, that conclusion should come as
no surprise. As the late Karl Popper once remarked, science itself is
103
only “common-sense knowledge writ large.”
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